We propose a Bayesian framework for the attribution of knowledge, and apply this framework to generate novel predictions about knowledge attribution for different types of ''Gettier cases'', in which an agent is led to a justified true belief yet has made erroneous assumptions. We tested these predictions using a paradigm based on semantic integration. We coded the frequencies with which participants falsely recalled the word ''thought'' as ''knew'' (or a near synonym), yielding an implicit measure of conceptual activation. Our experiments confirmed the predictions of our Bayesian account of knowledge attribution across three experiments. We found that Gettier cases due to counterfeit objects were not treated as knowledge (Experiment 1), but those due to intentionally-replaced evidence were (Experiment 2). Our findings are not well explained by an alternative account focused only on luck, because accidentally-replaced evidence activated the knowledge concept more strongly than did similar false belief cases (Experiment 3). We observed a consistent pattern of results across a number of different vignettes that varied the quality and type of evidence available to agents, the relative stakes involved, and surface details of content. Accordingly, the present findings establish basic phenomena surrounding people's knowledge attributions in Gettier cases, and provide explanations of these phenomena within a Bayesian framework.
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Introduction
In everyday life, it is often vital that we draw accurate distinctions between what we know, and what we merely believe. Whereas knowing may license action (Hawthorne & Stanley, 2008) , lack of knowledge calls for caution and consideration of more evidence. Moreover, we continually need to evaluate other people's knowledge. For example, when someone harms us, assignment of blame often involves assessing whether that person knew that their actions would have harmful consequences (e.g., Young & Saxe, 2011) . Evaluating knowledge requires an understanding of what it means to know, raising an important psychological question: what is people's concept of knowledge?
Recent psychological research on this question (Nagel, San Juan, & Mar, 2013; Starmans & Friedman, 2012; Turri, Buckwalter, & Blouw, 2014) has taken inspiration from philosophical analyses of knowledge. Philosophers once commonly accepted that knowledge is justified true belief (JTB; Ayer, 1956; Plato, 1961 
